Securities Regulation by Flint, George Lee, Jr.
SMU Annual Texas Survey
Volume 5 Article 15
2019
Securities Regulation
George Lee Flint Jr.
St. Mary's University School of Law, gflint@stmarytx.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smuatxs
Part of the Securities Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Annual Texas
Survey by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
George Lee Flint Jr., Securities Regulation, 5 SMU Ann. Tex. Surv. 391 (2019)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smuatxs/vol5/iss1/15
SECURITIES REGULATION
George Lee Flint, Jr.*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. COVERAGE OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACTS. 392
A. “INSURANCE CONTRACTS” AS SECURITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
B. CORPORATE SUBSIDIARIES AS AIDERS AND
ABETTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
II. REGISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
A. REGISTRATION OF SECURITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395
B. EXEMPT TRANSACTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395
C. MARKET OPERATORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
D. ENFORCEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398
III. SECURITIES FRAUD COURT DECISIONS UNDER
THE FEDERAL ACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
A. CONVERTING CONSUMER FRAUD INTO SECURITIES
FRAUD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
B. SCIENTER FOR ENHANCING REVENUE WITH
UNDERSTATED LOSS RESERVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402
C. INSIDER SHORT-SWING PROFITS: CHOICE OF CASH OR
STOCK TO PAY WITHHOLDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
IV. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406
Securities regulation deals primarily with the laws preventing and
providing remedies for fraud in the sale of stocks and bonds. Texas has
two major statutes to combat securities fraud: The Texas Securities Act
(TSA) and the Texas Stock Fraud Act (TSFA).1 Because the legislature
modeled the fraud provisions of the TSA on the federal statutes,2 Texas
courts use federal decisions under the federal statutes to interpret the
TSA’s similar language.3 This article, therefore, includes the U.S. Court
* H. Andy Professor of Commercial Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San
Antonio, Texas; B.A., 1966, B.S., 1966, M.A., 1969, University of Texas at Austin; Nuc. E.
1969, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Ph.D. (Physics), 1973, J.D. 1975, University of
Texas at Austin.
1. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-1–581-600; TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 27.01.
2. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 cmt. (Comment to 1977 Amendment);
House Comm. of Fin. Insts., Tex. S.B. 469, 65th Leg., R.S. (1977).
3. See, e.g., Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Ryder Scott Co., 402 S.W.3d 719, 741
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v.
Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 102 n.13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); see
also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 66 SMU L. REV. 1129, 1130 n.3 (2013)
(discussing Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.); George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 60
SMU L. REV. 1293, 1299–302 (2007) (discussing Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc.).
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of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit cases involving state law and securities
fraud under federal law. The author does not intend for this article to
exhaust all aspects of securities regulation but rather to update the Texas-
based securities practitioner on new Texas developments of interest
during the period of December 1, 2017 to November 30, 2018.
I. COVERAGE OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACTS
The definitions, especially those relating to what constitutes a security
and the persons liable, determine the fraudulent transactions subject to
the securities acts.4 The Fifth Circuit dealt with a securities broker seek-
ing a reduced enhancement of his prison term, claiming he sold insurance
products rather than the securities forbidden under a regulatory body’s
order.5 The Fifth Circuit also confronted a buyer of bonds of a failed
corporation claiming that his corporate broker and its parent had aided
and abetted the corporate fraud engaged in by another corporate
subsidiary.6
A. “INSURANCE CONTRACTS” AS SECURITIES
The Federal Securities Act defines “securities” to include bonds, partic-
ipations in profit-sharing agreements, and investment contracts.7 Never-
theless, the federal public defender in United States v. Blount,
representing a criminal defendant seeking a reduced enhancement on his
imprisonment for marketing a Ponzi scheme while subject to a prior order
of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) barring him
from selling “securities,” claimed that certain investments sold in the
Ponzi scheme by the defendant, a licensed insurance salesman, were in-
surance contracts and not securities.8 The defendant advertised “himself
as selling annuities, life insurance, long-term care insurance, disability in-
come insurance, and employee health benefits planning.”9 However, he
“primarily offered and sold discretionary IRA’s” consisting of “Timber
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)–(3) (2012); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-
4(A)–(B).
5. United States v. Blount, 906 F.3d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 2018).
6. Giancarlo v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 725 F. App’x 278 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 199, 202.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2018).
8. Blount, 906 F.3d at 383, 385. The defendant had previously worked as a licensed
securities broker selling unsuitable investments to investors for a decade by misrepresent-
ing material information. Id. at 383. Consequently, FINRA issued an order banning him
from the securities industry. Id. Nevertheless, the defendant resumed working as a licensed
securities broker for an additional decade selling investments in his Ponzi scheme until
FINRA reported him to government authorities who prosecuted him for wire fraud and
obtaining his prison sentence, enhanced for violating a prior administrative order, which
the defendant did not appeal. Id. at 383–84. The defendant later filed a motion to vacate
the sentence due to ineffective counsel and obtained a slightly reduced prison sentence,
which he appealed to the Fifth Circuit to remove the enhancement for violating the
FINRA order. Id. at 384.
9. Original Brief for the Appellant John Steven Blount at 11, Blount, 906 F.3d 381
(No. 17-30623), 2018 WL 333378, at *11.
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Investment Management Organization bonds, representing investments
in timber companies who sell timber to other companies for profit,”
promising returns between 11% and 15%.10 The defendant also sold ficti-
tious “remodeling contracts” between one of his shell companies and ma-
jor retail outlets, projecting returns of 15% to 19%.11 It did not take long
for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to reject the defen-
dant’s contention. These investments were bonds and investment con-
tracts, clearly included within the definition of securities.12
B. CORPORATE SUBSIDIARIES AS AIDERS AND ABETTORS
The United States Supreme Court does not impute securities fraud lia-
bility from one corporate entity to another related entity when they fol-
low corporate formalities.13 In Giancarlo v. UBS Financial Services, Inc.,
the class action plaintiffs attempted to hold liable a corporate investment
bank and two of its corporate subsidiaries—one an investment banker for
the defrauding corporation and the other the retail brokerage dealing
with the plaintiffs—for the investment bank subsidiary’s structuring in-
vestment vehicles that enabled the defrauding corporation to mislead the
public concerning its financial performance.14 The trial court dismissed
the action for failure to state a cause of action.15 The enterprising plain-
tiffs’ attorneys concocted a joint venture theory to impute the knowledge
of the parent corporation and its investment banking subsidiary corpora-
tion concerning the fraud of the defrauding corporation to the other cor-
porate subsidiary, the retail brokerage with which the plaintiffs had
dealt.16 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit quickly rejected
10. Id. The federal public defender’s second argument for the defendant’s non-viola-
tion of the FINRA order was that he made the sales as insurance products under an insur-
ance license. Id. at *12.
11. Brief on Behalf of the Appellee at 5–6, Blount, 906 F.3d 381 (No. 17-30623), 2018
WL 921692, at *5–6.
12. Blount, 906 F.3d at 386. Consequently, the defendant had violated the FINRA
order and his enhanced prison term was upheld. Id. at 386–87. The other issue in the case
was whether the FINRA order was an administrative order for purposes of the enhance-
ment, raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 384. Since the Fifth Circuit had no prece-
dents that FINRA, although a private self-regulatory entity, nevertheless mirrored a
typical government oversight body, and any error of the district court was not “obvious” or
“readily apparent.” See id. at 385.
13. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 137–46 (2011)
(declining to disregard the corporate structure to impute securities fraud liability to a par-
ent corporation and its subsidiary corporation serving as an investment advisor to a third
entity, a mutual fund created by the parent corporation, that issued a false prospectus since
corporate formalities were followed).
14. Giancarlo v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 725 F. App’x 278, 279–80 (5th Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 199, 202.
15. Id. at 278.
16. See Appellants’ Brief at 19–22, Giancarlo, 725 F. App’x 278 (No. 16-20663), 2017
WL 896069, at *19–22. The trial court in a companion case to Giancarlo similarly refused
to increase securities fraud liability by expanding it from one entity to another when the
activities of the two entities are not overlapping. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative &
“ERISA” Litig., 238 F. Supp. 3d 799, 900 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
The securities laws also require a Chinese wall between the investment banking portions
and the retail brokerage departments of investment banks to prevent insider trading, which
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the joint venture theory because the two subsidiaries were organized
under Delaware law17 and Delaware law required a sharing of both prof-
its and losses among the joint venturers which was absent from the
pleadings.18
The Fifth Circuit then examined the securities fraud elements19 for the
two entities with knowledge of the defrauding corporation, focusing on
the presumption of reliance from the materiality of the omission, which
requires a duty to disclose.20 The plaintiffs’ attorneys attempted to manu-
facture three duties. First was a National Association of Securities Deal-
ers (NASD) rule requiring disclosure of an omission that would make a
prior communication misleading, but there was no prior communication
by the parent and the investment banking subsidiary.21 Second was a duty
to disclose inside information under a special relationship, but the Su-
preme Court had previously rejected a duty to disclose from the mere
possession of inside information.22 Third, the investment banker was a
market maker, but the plaintiffs did not allege that they bought from that
market maker, of which there were many.23 For the brokerage subsidiary,
the plaintiffs claimed a duty through the retail relationship, but the plain-
tiffs did not demonstrate the brokerage subsidiary had any knowledge to
disclose.24 Because plaintiffs’ attorneys were unable to find any duty for
the parent corporation and the investment banking subsidiary to disclose
to the clients of the brokerage subsidiary, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal.25
II. REGISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT
The TSA created the Texas State Securities Board (TSSB) to handle
the registrations required by the TSA and to serve as an enforcement
agency.26 The basic rule of most securities laws is that securities must be
if present would destroy the attribution of the knowledge of one to the other. See generally
WILLIAM M. PRIFTI, 24 SECURITIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OFFERINGS § 5:30 (2d ed. 2010).
17. See Brief of Appellees at 6, Giancarlo, 725 F. App’x 278 (No. 16-20663) (5th Cir.
2018), 2017 WL 6371456, at *6. The plaintiff also contended in oral argument that Dela-
ware law governed. Giancarlo, 725 F. App’x at 283 n.4.
18. Giancarlo, 725 F. App’x at 284.
19. For the elements of securities fraud actions under the federal statutes, see infra
note 72 and accompanying text.
20. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1972)
(for securities fraud based on failure to disclose rather than on a misrepresentation, all that
need be shown for reliance is a duty to disclose material information that was breached);
Giancarlo, 725 F. App’x at 283.
21. Giancarlo, 725 F. App’x at 284–85; see NASD Manual, Rule 2210(d)(1)(A) (now
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Rule 2210).
22. Giancarlo, 725 F. App’x at 285; see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230
(1980).
23. Giancarlo, 725 F. App’x at 285–86.
24. Id. at 286.
25. Id. at 289. The non-securities issue in the case involved the refusal to allow the
plaintiffs to amend the complaint due to the failure to timely amend the complaint and the
failure to explain their long delay in seeking to amend the complaint. See id. at 287–89.
26. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-2.
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registered with their corresponding regulatory agency unless they fall
within an exemption.27 Similarly, unless they fit an exemption from regis-
tration, sellers of securities must register before selling securities in the
state, and investment advisers must register before rendering investment
advice in the state.28 Enforcement actions generally focus on issuers fail-
ing to register their securities, and simultaneously their selling agents, and
making misleading statements to aid their sales.
A. REGISTRATION OF SECURITIES
The TSSB updated its registration requirements to increase uniformity
with other states in reviewing applications to register securities by
amending its rules to conform to the recently updated North American
Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) policies, principally per-
mitting electronic offering documents and electronic signatures.29
B. EXEMPT TRANSACTIONS
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently amended its
intrastate exemption from federal registration, principally by adopting
Rule 147A to facilitate crowdfunding by not requiring issuers to be incor-
porated in the state where the securities are sold, provided their principal
place of business is in that state, and not banning them from general solic-
itation, provided they make sure the purchasers are residents of that
state.30 The TSSB made a number of changes to its rules to facilitate a
Rule 147A offering, by (1) adding a rule for the exemption31; (2) pre-
scribing a form for the notice to the TSSB claiming the exemption32; (3)
amending the crowdfunding portal rules to allow the portals to offer and
sell the Rule 147A offering33; and (4) changing the crowdfunding portal
forms to effect the changes.34 The TSSB also amended its crowdfunding
exemption rule to permit the use of segregated accounts up to $1 million
in lieu of an escrow account because the escrow agent providing that ser-
27. See id. art. 581-7(A).
28. See id. art. 581-13(A).
29. See 2018 Tex. Reg. Text 476675 (NS), adopted by 2018 Tex. Reg. Text 476675 (NS)
(codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 113.14).
30. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147A (2018).
31. See 2018 Tex. Reg. Text 476682 (NS), adopted by 2018 Tex. Reg. Text 476682 (NS)
(codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 139.26) (provided the issuer is not a public com-
pany or securities investor, the offer is made exclusively with a registered dealer or
crowdfunding portal with specified information, receives no more than $5,000 from a single
purchaser, uses an escrow account or segregated account up to $1 million, and files a notice
with the TSSB).
32. See 2018 Tex. Reg. Text 476681 (NS), adopted by 2018 Tex. Reg. Text 476681 (NS)
(codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 133.21).
33. See 2018 Tex. Reg. Text 476676 (NS), adopted by 2018 Tex. Reg. Text. 476676 (NS)
(codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. §§ 115.19 & 115.20).
34. See 2017 Tex. Reg. Text 476679 (NS), adopted by 2018 Tex. Reg. Text. 476679 (NS)
(retracting 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 133.15 & 133.20); 2017 Tex. Reg. Text 476680
(NS), adopted by 2018 Tex. Reg. Text 476680 (NS) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN.
§§ 133.15 & 133.20).
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vice decided to end its service.35
C. MARKET OPERATORS
One common feature of state regulation of securities is the usual re-
quirement to register as a seller of securities before selling securities in
the state, and to register as an investment adviser before rendering in-
vestment advice.36 Registration infractions generally surface when apply-
ing or reapplying for registration.
The TSSB prosecuted several enforcement actions against dealers and
selling agents for the failure of a registered agent to report various em-
barrassing required matters,37 including (1) a discharge from employment
as a selling agent for using an email account to solicit clients for the sell-
ing agent’s side businesses as a financial advisor and insurance sales-
man38; (2) a criminal misdemeanor for theft of property valued between
$50 and $50039; (3) six unsatisfied tax liens from the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS)40; and (4) three compromises with creditors and two civil
judgments while serving as a selling agent.41 The TSSB also prosecuted
enforcement actions against a provider of brokerage and technology ser-
vices for failing to follow its supervisory procedures to learn that two in-
vestment advisers had failed to renew their registrations in Texas42 and
against a dealer for not having supervisory procedures in place governing
fees for clients moved from brokerage to investment advisory accounts,
resulting in overcharging some clients.43
The TSSB prosecuted several enforcement actions against investment
advisers and investment-adviser representatives. These involved (1) fail-
ure to renew the registration resulting in practicing unregistered44; (2)
35. See 2017 Tex. Reg. Text 467148 (NS), adopted by 2017 Tex. Reg. Text 467148 (NS)
(codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 139.25).
36. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-13(A).
37. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 115.9(a)(6) (requiring dealers and their agents to
report changes on previously filed forms within thirty days).
38. See In re Agent Registration of Mohamed H. Eldawy, No. REG18-SUS-03, 2018
WL 3972287, at *2–3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 15, 2018) (suspension for sixty days).
39. See In re Inv. Adviser Representative Registration and the Agent Registration of
John William Noey, No. IC18-CAF-01, 2018 WL 3972284, at *1–2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug.
15, 2018) (reprimanded and administrative fine of $5,000).
40. See In re Inv. Adviser Representative Registration and the Agent Registration of
Richard L. Havard, No. REG17-CAF-07, 2017 WL 6421021, at *1–2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec.
1, 2017) (reprimanded and administrative fine of $7,500).
41. See In re Agent Registration of Octavio Tovar, No. REG17-CAF-06, 2017 WL
5689554, at *1–2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Nov. 21, 2017) (reprimanded and administrative fine of
$3,000).
42. See In re Dealer Registration of Trade-PMR Inc., No. IC18-CAF-03, 2018 WL
5911715, at *1–2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Nov. 5, 2018) (reprimanded and administrative fine of
$25,000).
43. See In re Dealer and Inv. Adviser Registration of Brazos Sec., Inc., No. IC18-CAF-
04, 2018 WL 5911713, at *1–2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Nov. 5, 2018) (reprimanded and adminis-
trative fine of $20,000).
44. See In re Inv. Adviser Registration of TK2 Advisers, No. IC18-CAF-02, 2018 WL
3972286 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 15, 2018) (reprimand and retention of a compliance auditor
for two years).
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engaging in inequitable securities sales practices by recommending an ac-
tive trading strategy without considering trading costs and the rate of re-
turn needed to earn a profit45; (3) providing discretionary investment
management services to five clients using their personal usernames and
passwords to log into their retail brokerage accounts without registering
with the TSSB in any capacity46; (4) failing to cooperate with a TSSB
investigation into suspected solicitation of potential investors for private
securities via email and refusal to provide the requested email records47;
and (5) failing to report various required matters such as unsatisfied
judgments.48
At its most recent session, the Texas Legislature enacted a bill to pro-
tect vulnerable adults (those over sixty-five years old or with disabilities)
from financial exploitation (taking the vulnerable adult’s property or de-
priving him or her of its use) by enlisting dealers and investment advisers
in ferreting out securities fraud on vulnerable adults.49 Dealers and in-
vestment advisers protect vulnerable adults by assessing suspected finan-
cial exploitation and submitting reports to the Texas Securities
Commissioner, and placing holds on the vulnerable adult’s accounts.50 To
implement this act, the TSSB adopted rules, one for dealers and one for
investment advisers, requiring them to establish and implement written
procedures for collecting and reporting information relating to the sus-
pected financial exploitation of vulnerable adults and specifying the infor-
mation for their written report submitted electronically to the TSSB.51
And the TSSB prosecuted an enforcement action against a person who
serviced the computer of an 88-year old and began trading securities from
the elderly victim’s securities account with a registered dealer; the dealer
filed a report of suspected financial exploitation of the elderly person
when $27,000 was transferred from the securities account to a linked ac-
count at a credit union.52
45. See In re Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of Jason N. Anderson, No.
REG18-SUS-01, 2018 WL 706291 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Jan. 30, 2018) (suspension for ninety
days).
46. See In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Sunlight Invs., No. REG18-CAF-02, 2018
WL 3434714 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. July 10, 2018) (reprimanded and administrative fine of
$15,000).
47. See In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Jackson Financial Servs., No. IC17-REV-05,
2017 WL 6942368 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 29, 2017) (registration revoked).
48. See In re Inv. Adviser Representative Registration and the Agent Registration of
Robin Curt Holcomb, No. REG18-CAF-03, 2018 WL 6307933 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Nov. 27,
2018) (reprimand and administrative fine of $3,000).
49. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-45; see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securi-
ties Regulation, 4 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 425, 434 (2018) (discussing the legislative amend-
ment to the TSA to protect vulnerable adults).
50. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-45.
51. For dealers, see 2017 Tex. Reg. Text 476677 (NS), adopted by 2018 Tex. Reg.
476677 (NS) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 115.21 (2018)); for investment advi-
sors, see 2017 Tex. Reg. Text 476678 (NS), adopted by 2018 Tex. Reg. Text 476678 (NS)
(codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 116.21 (2018)).
52. See In re Mike Chamley, No. ENF-18-CDO-1766, 2018 WL 3831002, at *1–2 (Tex.
St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 6, 2018) (ordering a hold and a cease and desist).
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D. ENFORCEMENT
The TSSB generally enforces its requirements for registration through
emergency orders.53 Because con artists exploit current news and tech-
nology to confound unwary investors, the TSSB enumerates the top
threats to investors: (1) cryptocurrencies, because they are not backed by
the government and their price is not set by a centralized authority; (2)
oil and gas deals, because investors can’t investigate the claim; and (3)
foreign currency trading, because it is volatile and can result in significant
losses in a few hours.54 The TSSB’s actions focus on these threats.
Due to the recent excitement involving cryptocurrency investments,
the TSSB conducted a major investigation of the promoters of these in-
vestments who appeared to be illegally or fraudulently using “online ad-
vertisements, social media, and other public solicitations to attract Texas
investors.”55 Consequently, the TSSB had numerous actions against pur-
veyors of cryptocurrencies through public solicitations, resulting in cease
and desist orders and charges of selling unregistered securities through
unregistered dealers, engaging in fraud by failing to make disclosures,
and making materially misleading statements. These schemes involved (1)
an investment in a bitcoin exchange lending up to $100,000 for up to 40%
interest per month56; (2) a solicitation of investor sales agents to offer a
cryptocurrency for commissions57; (3) a new digital currency that could
be traded and later used to purchase blockchain technology earning up to
48% per month58; (4) a cryptocurrency exchangeable into fiat currency
using photos of purported partners taken from unrelated individuals on
the internet59; (5) a cryptocurrency trading program delivering 8% re-
turns each week and promissory notes tied to the sale of marijuana prom-
ising 100% guaranteed returns60; (6) a cloud-based cryptocurrency
53. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581–23.
54. See TEX. ST. SEC. BD., Top 10 Investor Threats (In Time for the Holidays) (Nov.
29, 2017), https://www.ssb.texas.gov/news-publications/top-10-investor-threats-time-holi
days [https://perma.cc/KH63-MN97].
55. See TEX. ST. SEC. BD., Widespread Fraud Found in Cryptocurrency Offerings (Apr.
10, 2018), https://www.ssb.texas.gov/news-publications/enforcement-report-widespread-
fraud-found-cryptocurrency-offerings [https://perma.cc/PW2Y-GG8G]. The TSSB “was the
first state securities regulator to enter an enforcement order against a cryptocurrency firm”
and also has entered the most of any state. See TEX. ST. SEC. BD., Cryptocurrency Re-
sources, https://www.ssb.texas.gov/cryptocurrency-resources.
56. See In re BitConnect, No. ENF-18-CDO-1754, 2018 WL 400434, at *2, *7 (Tex. St.
Sec. Bd. Jan. 4, 2018) (emergency cease and desist order).
57. See In re R2B Coin, No. ENF-18-CDO-1756, 2018 WL 577735, at *2, *7 (Tex. St.
Sec. Bd. Jan. 24, 2018) (emergency cease and desist order).
58. See In re Davorcoin, No. ENF-18-CDO-1757, 2018 WL 818566, at *2, *5–6 (Tex.
St. Sec. Bd. Feb. 2, 2018) (emergency cease and desist order).
59. See In re LeadInvest, No. ENF-18-CDO-1760, 2018 WL 1157270, at *5–3, *10 (Tex.
St. Sec. Bd. Feb. 26, 2018) (emergency cease and desist order).
60. See In re Estrada Trucking, Inc.; Caleb Estrada Vasquez; Venture Capital Cash aka
Capital Cash Funding aka Capital Cash; Fin. Freedom Club, Inc., dba Millionaire Mentor
Univ.; Mark J. Moncher; 911 Moneystore, Inc., and Frank Dalotto, No. ENF-18-CDO-
1761, 2018 WL 1789734, at *2, *5, *10 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Apr. 5, 2018) (emergency cease
and desist order).
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mining program61; (7) two bitcoin trading programs that would increase
ten-fold in twenty-one days with returns 100% guaranteed62; (8) a bitcoin
trading program using an automatic trading bot offering high returns with
a 100% guarantee and testimonials from famous persons63; (9) a
cryptocurrency mining program claiming annual interest rate returns of
180% to 250%64; (10) bitcoin mining contracts providing consistent re-
turns of up to 150% per year65; (11) crypto mining power contracts with
guaranteed returns of 200%66; and (12) a crypto mining program adver-
tised on LinkedIn.67 Two additional actions involved fraudulent
cryptocurrency schemes, linked to foreign scammers, to extract moneys
from Texan investors. One, based in Volgograd, Russia, sent spam emails
impersonating a California-based crypto exchange platform directing in-
vestors to a website containing its misleading marketing efforts, including
a video misrepresenting a Fortune journalist as one of the promoters.68
Another one, based in Belize, offered shares in a company developing a
hack-proof custody solution for digital assets to facilitate anonymous and
untraceable transfers of cryptocurrencies and fiat currencies using a video
of former President Obama touting the technology of the company im-
bedded on its website.69
61. See In re Bitcoin Trading & Cloud Mining Ltd., aka BTCrush, Jaylon Cross, Bruce
Rodgerson, Robin Lozinski and Thomas A. Johnson, No. ENF-18-CDO-1762, 2018 WL
2200023, at *2, *5–6 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 8, 2018) (emergency cease and desist order).
62. See In re Forex EA & Bitcoin Inv., LLC, aka My Forex EA & Bitcoin Inv. LLC,
aka My Forex EA, James Butcher and Richard Dunn, No. ENF-18-CDO-1763, 2018 WL
2198712, at *1–2, *4 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 8, 2018) (emergency cease and desist order); see
also In re Ultimate Assets, LLC, Daniel Dishmon and John Jason Woodard, No. ENF-18-
CDO-1769, 2018 WL 4567821, at *1–2, *4 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 18, 2018) (emergency
cease and desist order).
63. See In re Wind Wide Coin, aka WWC, Inc., Charles Roman, Fred Andrew and
John Anny, No. ENF-18-CDO-1764, 2018 WL 2296149, at *2–3, *5–6 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd.
May 15, 2018) (emergency cease and desist order).
64. See In re Symatri LLC FKA Sivitas, LLC, Mintage Mining, LLC, BC Holdings and
Invs. LLC dba Mintage Mining, Social Membership Network Holding, LLC, Nui Social,
LLC, Darren Olayan, Wyatt McCullough and William Douglas Whetsell, ENF-18-CDO-
1765, 2018 WL 3434548, at *2–3, *13 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. June 11, 2018) (emergency cease
and desist order).
65. See In re USI-Tech Ltd., Clifford “Cliff” Thomas and Michael “Mike” Rivera, No.
ENF-17-CDO-1753, 2017 WL 6731508, at *1–2, *4 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 20, 2017) (emer-
gency cease and desist order).
66. See In re AWS Mining Pty Ltd., Automated Web Services Mining aka AWS Min-
ing, Daniel Beduschi, Alexandre Campos, Jessica Nunes Sivirino, Mycoindeal, AWS Elite,
Josiah Kostek, West Texas Oilfield Cloud Miners Club and Kenneth Luster, No. ENF-18-
CDO-1771, 2018 WL 5911712, at *2, *11 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Nov. 6, 2018) (emergency cease
and desist order).
67. See In re EXY Crypto aka EXECrypto, Morgan Nolan, Rafael Logan and Melissa
Spring, No. ENF-18-CDO-1772, 2018 WL 5911714, at *1, *6 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Nov. 6, 2018)
(emergency cease and desist order).
68. See In re Coins Miner Inv. Ltd. aka Coins Miner and Ana Julia Lara, No. ENF-18-
CDO-1767, 2018 WL 4567819, at *1, *6 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 18, 2018) (emergency cease
and desist order).
69. See In re DGBK Ltd. aka DigitalBank, Tim Weiss, Ranka Romic and Kim Joseph
Manning, No. ENF-18-CDO-1768, 2018 WL 4567820, at *2–3, *9 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept.
18, 2018) (emergency cease and desist order).
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The TSSB also prosecuted enforcement actions against an oil and gas
drilling program and a currency trading program. The oil and gas pro-
gram was marketed without disclosing the drilling costs, that the SEC had
prosecuted actions against the promoters for securities fraud under the
federal laws, that prior investors filed several civil actions against the pro-
moters, or that there were numerous IRS tax liens against the promot-
ers.70 The currency trading program used a fraudulent certificate of
formation and fake testimonials on its website, and it failed to disclose
the background and expertise of its financial professionals doing the
trading.71
III. SECURITIES FRAUD COURT DECISIONS UNDER
THE FEDERAL ACTS
One major reason legislatures passed securities acts was to facilitate
investors’ actions to recover their moneys through a simplified fraud ac-
tion that removed scienter and privity, the most difficult elements to
prove in a common-law fraud action. These securities act changes gener-
ally apply only to the primary market. When investors purchase on the
secondary market, their actions reintroduce these obstacles.
The fraud provisions of the TSA are modeled on the federal statutes.
Therefore, Texas courts look to federal decisions under the federal stat-
utes to interpret the TSA provisions with similar language.72 As a result,
there is an interest in Fifth Circuit securities law fraud opinions. Fraud
actions under the federal statutes generally possess six elements: (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection
with a purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; and
(6) “loss causation”, that is, a causal connection between the material
misrepresentation and the loss.73 The last element comes from the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).74
A. CONVERTING CONSUMER FRAUD INTO SECURITIES FRAUD
When an issuer engages in practices that adversely affect its customers
and spawn lawsuits on behalf of consumers and state agencies, they are
also likely to adversely affect the share price, triggering shareholder law-
suits for securities fraud. In Employees’ Retirement System v. Whole
Foods Market, Inc., the issuer had mislabeled pre-packaged foods by in-
70. See In re Sourcerock Energy Phoenix Prospect, LP; Sourcerock Energy GP, LLC;
Sourcerock Energy Partners, LP; J.A. Gilbert aka Jason A. Gilbert; and Parker Hallam,
No. ENF-18-CDO-1758, 2018 WL 939784, at *2–5 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Feb. 9, 2018) (emer-
gency cease and desist order).
71. See In re GoForex Grp. aka Go Forex Grp., Mary A. Scott, and Sharon Hender-
son, No. ENF-18-CDO-1770, 2018 WL 4964196, at *3–5, *7 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Oct. 10, 2018)
(emergency cease and desist order).
72. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
73. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (discussing commission
rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018)).
74. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2012).
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cluding the weight of the packaging in the weight of the food, thereby
charging consumers for more food than the packages actually contained,
violating national weights and measures standards and state laws incorpo-
rating those standards.75 Two actions by states resulted in fines approxi-
mately one year before the price of the stock declined.76 A major city’s
consumer affairs department issued a blistering report about the
overcharging one month before that price decline; the report caused in-
tense media attention during that month.77 The stock price declined 10%
the day after the issuer released its third quarter results, which missed the
issuer’s sales target and showed a noticeable slowdown in sales growth
after the release of the city’s report.78 Shareholders then brought a class
action securities fraud lawsuit under the Federal Securities Exchange Act
based on three types of statements: (1) assertions that the issuer provided
competitive pricing to consumers and was working to improve its pricing;
(2) proclamations that the issuer held itself to high standards for trans-
parency, quality, and corporate responsibility; and (3) published earnings
statements with inflated earnings in violation of generally accepted ac-
counting principles that require substantial performance before recording
the earnings.79 The district court dismissed the securities lawsuit for fail-
ure to state a claim because they failed to properly allege material mis-
representation, scienter, or loss causation.80
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed because the
first type of statement was not a misrepresentation, the second type of
statement was not material, and the third type81 did not cause the share-
holders’ losses.82 The allegations concerning competitive pricing and im-
proving pricing were not misrepresentations, because there were no
allegations as to the pricing of competitors and no allegations as to the
prior pricing of the issuer.83 The allegations relating to high standards and
corporate quality were not material, because a reasonable investor would
not rely on generalized, self-serving statements by the issuer, but would
rely on facts to determine whether the statements were true.84 And the
allegations concerning the earnings statements did not follow the Fifth
Circuit’s framework for loss causation: a corrective disclosure, with a
stock price drop shortly thereafter, and elimination of other possible ex-
75. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 905 F.3d 892, 894–95 (5th Cir.
2018).
76. Id. at 895.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 895–96.
79. Id. at 896–98.
80. See Markman v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 269 F. Supp. 3d 779, 786–87 (W.D. Tex.
2017), aff’d sub nom. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 905 F.3d 892 (5th
Cir. 2018).
81. Financial Statements filed with the SEC not in compliance with generally accepted
accounting principles are presumed to be misleading. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(1) (2018).
82. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 905 F.3d at 900.
83. Id. at 900–01.
84. Id. at 901–02.
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planations for the stock drop.85 The alleged corrective statement (release
of the earnings) did not reveal information not already known to the mar-
ket, because the mislabeling scandal had been known for a month prior to
the earnings report.86 Nor did the allegations indicate that the disap-
pointing sales numbers reflected customer dissatisfaction with the issuer’s
accounting practices.87 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.88
B. SCIENTER FOR ENHANCING REVENUE WITH
UNDERSTATED LOSS RESERVES
For scienter, the heightened federal pleading rule requires the com-
plainant to state with particularity the circumstances constituting the
fraud while the PSLRA requires the complainant to specify the fraudu-
lent statement, reasons why the statement is false, and facts giving rise to
a strong inference that the fraudster had the requisite intent.89 In the
Fifth Circuit, scienter requires an “intent to deceive . . . or that severe
recklessness in which the danger of misleading [investors] is either known
to the defendant or is so obvious that the defendant must have been
aware of it.”90 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has rejected the group plead-
ing doctrine, so the scienter must be of a specific issuer officer and scien-
ter may not be implied from prospectuses, registration statements, and
press releases.91
Attorneys for shareholders in securities class actions continue to have
difficulty pleading facts giving a strong inference of scienter. Yet, in
Alaska Electrical Pension Fund v. Asar, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit found a class action complaint sufficient even though the
court admitted the absence of a strong inference.92 The issuer was a lead-
ing provider of orthotic and prosthetic patient care services with most of
its revenue coming from reimbursements for its services by public and
private insurers.93 Problems in accounting developed for the issuer after
Congress expanded the Medicare audit program; many of the issuer’s
clinics failed to collect the required documentation, thereby failing the
audit and forcing a return of the reimbursement which might be recov-
ered after a lengthy appeal.94 Consequently, the issuer did not increase its
85. Id. at 903–04. For the framework, see Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Mississippi,
Puerto Rico Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Amedisys, Inc., 769 F.3d 313, 320–21 (5th Cir. 2014).
86. Id. at 904.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 905.
89. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(a) (2012) (“[T]he com-
plaint shall . . . state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defen-
dant acted with the required state of mind.”).
90. Southland Secs. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotations omitted) (citing Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961–62
(5th Cir. 1981) (en banc)); see George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 58 SMU L. REV.
1135, 1155–56 (2005) (discussing Southland).
91. See Southland, 365 F.3d at 365–66.
92. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Asar, 898 F.3d 648, 662 (5th Cir. 2018).
93. Id. at 652.
94. Id. at 653.
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reserve for disallowed Medicare sales.95 Another problem arose for the
issuer when it implemented a new data management system, which re-
sulted in fewer sales because employees had to spend significant amounts
of time transitioning patient data to the new system.96 The alleged mis-
statements dealt with depicting the issuer with strong same-store sales,
stating (1) that its Medicare reimbursements were more successful than
they were and that reserves were adequate; (2) assuring investors that
internal controls were sufficient; and (3) understating the scope and size
of financial restatements.97 The issuer finally issued several restatements
of its financials over a year’s time in the amount of $87 million. These
restatements included several SEC filings which: (1) suggested that un-
identified former officers and employees may have fabricated inventory
records; (2) claimed the chief executive and financial officers set an inap-
propriate tone by urging certain financial targets; and (3) claimed the
chief financial officer engaged in inappropriate accounting practices to
enhance the issuer’s reported earnings.98 The class action was filed prior
to the restatements with the amended complaint alleging violations of
Exchange Act section 10(b) for securities fraud and section 20(a) for con-
trol person liability.99 The district court dismissed for failure to satisfy the
pleading requirements for scienter.100
The Fifth Circuit noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has established a
three point test for determining whether scienter satisfies the statutory
requirement of a strong inference of scienter: (1) take the allegations as
true; (2) consider the complaint in its entirety; and (3) take into account
plausible opposing inferences.101 The class action plaintiffs alleged that a
strong inference of scienter could be found from (1) the magnitude and
time period of the restatements; (2) the stock sales of the insiders; (3) the
issuer’s certifications under Sarbanes Oxley Act102; (4) the problems with
the Medicare audits and implementation of the new data management
system; (5) and the issuer’s audit committee report included in an SEC
filing.103 The Fifth Circuit quickly dismissed the first four. The timing and
magnitude of the accounting errors alone cannot support a strong infer-
ence of scienter; the significance depends on the circumstances, the
pleading of which was missing in this case.104 Insider trading alone “can-




98. Id. at 654.
99. Id.
100. See City of Pontiac Gen. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Hangar, Inc., 2017 WL 384072, at
*13 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2017).
101. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 898 F.3d at 655–56; see Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 581 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007).
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2012).
103. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 898 F.3d at 656.
104. Id. at 656, 664; see Owens v. Jastrow, 789 F.3d 529, 541 (5th Cir. 2015); see also
George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 2 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 437, 473–75 (2016)
(discussing Owens).
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is a plausible non-culpable explanation such as covering tax expenses pur-
suant to a 10b-1 trading plan.105 Similarly, Sarbanes Oxley filings do not
support a strong inference of scienter in the absence of facts that the cer-
tifiers had reason to know, or should have suspected from “glaring ac-
counting irregularities,” that the financials contained “material
misstatements or omissions[;]” again, the pleadings of such facts were ab-
sent in this case.106 And, the pleadings alleging officers must have known
of misstatements from their position with the issuer are insufficient with-
out special circumstances, which were absent in this case.107 But, as for
the audit committee’s report, the majority of the Fifth Circuit panel de-
termined differently. The audit committee’s report made no finding as to
the chief operating officer’s role in the accounting, so for him there was
no strong inference of scienter.108 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit majority
found no strong inference of scienter with respect to the chief executive
officer and chief financial officer setting an inappropriate tone by urging
certain financial targets because these are goals that virtually all issuer
insiders have, and it was undisputed that a lower-level employee had
orchestrated most of the fraud.109 But, as to the chief financial officer’s
and another employee’s use of inappropriate accounting practices to en-
hance the issuer’s reported earnings, the Fifth Circuit majority found sup-
portive of the inference that the chief financial officer shared the
objective of enhancing the issuer’s financial results or knew that others
were doing so, contributing to the inference of scienter.110 The dissenting
opinion of the remaining member of the Fifth Circuit panel correctly
noted that being supportive and contributing to the inference of scienter
do not satisfy the statutory requirement for a strong inference of scien-
ter.111 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court’s decision
with respect to the chief financial officer, affirmed the dismissal with re-
spect to the chief executive officer and chief operating officer, and re-
manded to consider whether to dismiss the controlling person claims.112
105. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 898 F.3d at 657; see Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v.
Integrated Elec. Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 553 (5th Cir. 2007); see also George Lee Flint, Jr.,
Securities Regulation, 61 SMU L. REV. 1107, 1124–25 (2008) (discussing Cent. Laborers’
Pension Fund).
106. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 898 F.3d 648 at 662–63; see Indiana Elec. Workers’
Pension Tr. Fund IBEW v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 545 (5th Cir. 2008).
107. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 898 F.3d at 663–64; see Neiman v. Bulmahn, 854 F.3d
741, 750 (5th Cir. 2017); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 4 SMU ANN.
TEX. SURV. 425, 446–48 (2018) (discussing Neiman).
108. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 898 F.3d at 659–60.
109. Id. at 660–62.
110. Id. at 662.
111. Id. at 668 (Ho, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 666–67. The defendants raised a second element of the fraud as mandating
dismissal, loss causation. Unfortunately, when each corrective disclosure was made, the
stock dropped 25% on the first correction, 18% on the second correction, and 80% on the
third correction. Id. at 665. Since there was no contravening negative event, these stock
drops adequately pleaded the loss causation element. Id. at 666.
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C. INSIDER SHORT-SWING PROFITS: CHOICE OF CASH OR STOCK
TO PAY WITHHOLDING
The Federal Securities Exchange Act, in order to provide a deterrent to
insider trading, also contains a cause of action for issuers, or shareholders
on behalf of the issuer, to force insiders to disgorge to the issuer any
profits made on short-swing trades with the sale and purchase less than
six months apart.113 The SEC, by rule, has provided an exemption to this
disgorgement to facilitate the offering of employee benefit plans by the
issuer by exempting transactions involving a disposition to the issuer if
the transaction is not discretionary and is pre-approved by the issuer’s
board of directors, a committee of the board, or a majority of the
shareholders.114
In Jordan v. Flexton, the shareholder, as a pro se litigant,115 brought
suit on behalf of the issuer to recover for shares issued to the issuer’s
officers under a long-term incentive compensation plan approved by the
shareholders.116 Under the plan, employees received restricted stock unit
awards approved by a board committee; however, the plan authorized the
issuer to deduct taxes required to be withheld by the Internal Revenue
Code.117 In making the grants, the board committee required the em-
ployee to pay cash to enable the issuer to meet the withholding require-
ments or the issuer would retain sufficient shares to meet the
withholding.118 The plaintiff shareholder contended that the award and
subsequent retention constituted the purchase and sale.119 The district
court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim.120 Before the Fifth
Circuit, the plaintiff shareholder contended that the participant’s choice
of paying the withholding in cash or in retained stock meant that the
transaction was discretionary, in violation of the exemption rule.121 The
Fifth Circuit noted that the officers had no control over the timing of the
transaction, the amount of the withholding to be made to the issuer, or
the price at which the withheld shares were sold, all of which supported
the non-discretionary aspect of the transaction.122 Consequently, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the dismissal.123
113. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012).
114. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(d) (2018).
115. Jordan v. Flexton, 729 F. App’x 282, 285 n.19 (5th Cir. 2018).
116. See Brief of Appellees at 7, Jordan, 729 F. App’x 282 (No. 17-20346), 2017 WL
3670505, at *7.
117. Id. at *8.
118. Id. at *9.
119. Id. at *9–12.
120. Jordan, 279 F. App’x at 282.
121. Id. at 285.
122. Id. at 285 n.18.
123. Id. at 286. The plaintiff shareholder also contended that the transaction was not
approved under the exemption rule, but did not raise the matter in his opening brief and
under Fifth Circuit law forfeits the issue.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit addressed some scope issues under the federal acts
relevant to similar language in the TSA and TSFA. The Fifth Circuit in a
criminal case recognized that bonds and investment contracts marketed
by a licensed insurance salesman are nevertheless securities. The Fifth
Circuit also determined that to impute the aiding and abetting of fraud
from one subsidiary and corporate parent required a sharing of both prof-
its and losses by the entities.
The TSSB updated its rules to comport with the new NASAA policy
concerning electronic submissions and electronic signatures. The TSSB
also enacted a new rule and amended several rules to permit intrastate
offerings under the SEC’s new Rule 147A allowing intrastate offerings to
use crowdfunding provided the issuer’s principal office is in the state and
the issuer takes precautions to ensure sales only to in-state investors. Fur-
ther, the TSSB enacted rules to implement the legislature’s enactment to
provide protection for vulnerable adults (those over age sixty-five or dis-
abled) by requiring agents of dealers and representatives of investment
advisers to monitor their client records and report any suspected financial
exploitation of vulnerable adults to their dealers and investment advisers,
who are to investigate and report to the TSSB.
The TSSB’s enforcement efforts against dealers focused on failing to
report embarrassing matters such as employment firings, criminal misde-
meanors, tax liens, and civil judgments. The enforcement efforts against
investment advisors concerned recommending a trading strategy without
considering the costs or prospects of success, trading client portfolios
without registration, and failing to cooperate with TSSB investigations.
The TSSB’s enforcement efforts against threats to investors involved
numerous actions dealing with cryptocurrencies, all for selling unregis-
tered securities through unregistered agents and involving fraudulent
statements and omissions of material facts.
For the federal fraud action, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of
an attempt to convert fraud committed by the issuer on its customers into
a securities fraud case against the issuer’s shareholders, but failed to al-
lege sufficient misstatements as the ones alleged were not a misrepresen-
tation, or not material, or did not cause the loss. The Fifth Circuit also
dealt with the issue of scienter for an issuer’s inability to quickly adjust to
changes in Medicare documentation resulting in insufficient loss reserves
for reported earnings. The court unconvincingly found a strong inference
of scienter for an audit committee report claiming the chief financial of-
ficer engaged in inappropriate accounting practices without identifying
the inappropriate practices since they supported the inference and con-
tributed to the inference. The Fifth Circuit also dealt with statutory in-
sider trading under the federal rules for short swing profits and found
that the insider’s choosing to pay the withholding tax with cash or shares
did not make the sale discretionary in violation of the SEC’s rule provid-
ing an exception to the short swing profit disgorgement.
